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THE CHANGING STANDARDS OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REGULATION: THE REAL IMPACT
OF MCCUTCHEON V. FEC
Hannah Dunn∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as
amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),
sets forth a variety of limits on financial campaign contributions “[t]o
promote fair practices in the conduct of election campaigns,”1
including dollar limitations on contributions and expenditures.2
However, a recent Supreme Court case decided that limits on how
much an individual may contribute in the aggregate are invalid under
the First Amendment.3 Previously, the Supreme Court had generally
upheld campaign finance controls as constitutionally proper to
prevent corruption.4 While the Supreme Court has struck down some
limitations on independent expenditures by individuals, the Court has
also upheld individual contribution limits as constitutionally valid.5
Legislative limits such as FECA have been viewed as “sufficient and
proper [for] . . . the prevention of corruption.”6
In 2014, the Supreme Court continued down a recent path of
diversion from previous support of contribution limits7 in
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
Loyola Marymount University, 2013. Special thanks to those who made this Comment possible:
Professor Justin Levitt, for providing direction and sharing his legal expertise; the editors and
staff members of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their time and detailed proofreading,
especially Cameron Bell, Leah Johannesson, Lauren Gerenraich, Morgan Davis, Justin Potesta,
and Andrew Beshai; and to my parents for their continuous love and support.
1. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
2. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006).
3. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
4. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Campaign Finance Laws—Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, §§ 2, 10 (2007).
5. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (per curiam).
6. Rosenhouse, supra note 4, at § 2.
7. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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McCutcheon v. FEC8 by striking down the aggregate limits on
campaign contributions set forth by 2 U.S.C. § 441a (“§ 441a”)
(limiting individual donors to an overall total of $123,000 to
candidates, national party committees, and certain political
committees) as a First Amendment violation.9 The base limits in
§ 441a (limiting donors to $2,600 per candidate), which were not
challenged, remain in effect.10
This Comment argues that although the Supreme Court should
not have struck down the aggregate limits on individual campaign
contributions in McCutcheon, the decision is unlikely to have a
substantial practical impact on campaign finance—however, the
decision has lasting legal implications. Part II of this Comment
provides a roadmap of McCutcheon’s journey to the Supreme Court,
and Part III outlines campaign finance regulation’s historical
background. Part IV examines how the Court came to its conclusion.
Part V discusses why the Court should have upheld the aggregate
limits but contrasts the likelihood of little to no practical impact with
a potentially substantial legal effect. Lastly, Part VI addresses the
possible consequences of a significant legal impact and the future of
campaign finance regulation.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In the 2011–2012 election and in compliance with the base
limits, Shaun McCutcheon contributed “a total of $33,088 to 16
different federal candidates” and “a total of $27,328 to several
noncandidate political committees.”11 McCutcheon wanted to donate
additional money to other candidates and various political
committees but was prevented from doing so by both the aggregate
limit on candidate contributions and the aggregate limit on
contributions to political committees.12 McCutcheon alleged that he
plans to continue making similar contributions in the future and
wants to donate “at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
Id. at 1442.
Id.
Id. at 1443.
Id.
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to non-candidate political committees” in the 2013–2014 election.13
Moreover, Republican National Committee (RNC) would like to
receive McCutcheon’s desired contributions as well as donations
from other “similarly situated individuals.”14
B. Procedural History
McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint with the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in June 2012, arguing that
the aggregate limits set forth under § 441a unconstitutionally
violated the First Amendment.15 McCutcheon and the RNC moved
for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the aggregate
limits, which was met by the FEC’s motion to dismiss the case.16 The
district court granted the FEC’s motion to dismiss, concluding the
aggregate limits were proper under the First Amendment because
they “prevented evasion of the base limits.”17 More specifically, the
court determined that although it was unlikely that many separate
entities would conspire to pool donation resources for a single
donor’s benefit, “such a scenario [was] ‘not hard to imagine.’”18
Therefore, the district court saw the aggregate and base limits as a
“coherent system rather than . . . individual limits,” thus rejecting the
constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits.19 McCutcheon and
the RNC then directly appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge
the aggregate limits’ constitutionality.20
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to
participate in the democratic process through political
contributions.21 However, that right is not absolute. Spurred by
beliefs that “aggregated capital unduly influence[s] politics” and
“concern with the ‘political potentialities of wealth’ and their
‘untoward consequences for the democratic process,’”22 Congress
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1443–44.
Id. at 1444.
Id.
U.S. CONST., amend. I, § 2.
Rosenhouse, supra note 4, at § 2.
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enacted legislation such as FECA to curb opportunities for
corruption by placing limits and enforcing regulations on campaign
finance.23
These limits, as amended by BCRA, allowed individuals to
contribute a maximum of $2,600 per election to any given candidate;
$32,400 per year to a national party committee; $10,000 per year to a
state or local party committee; and $5,000 per year to a political
action committee (“PAC”).24 Section 441a(a) outlined two types of
campaign contribution limits: “base limits,” and “aggregate limits.”25
The former controls how much money an individual may donate to a
particular candidate or committee, and the latter controls how much
money an individual may donate in total to any and all candidates
and committees.26 The U.S. Supreme Court has, in the past,
recognized limits on campaign contributions as constitutionally
protected to limit corruption. In Buckley v. Valeo,27 the Supreme
Court found “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of
financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify”
contribution limits28 and upheld restrictions set forth by BCRA on
contributions beyond federal limits29 in McConnell v. FEC.30 More
recently, the Supreme Court has moved away from the protection of
contribution limits and engaged in a string of decisions that chip
away at the foundation of regulated campaign finance. In Citizens
United v. FEC,31 a ban on independent corporate expenditures was
struck down as an unconstitutional suppression of speech.32 And, as
stated above, in McCutcheon, the aggregate limits imposed by § 441a
were found invalid under the First Amendment.33

23. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
24. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
25. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
26. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id.
30. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
31. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
32. Id. at 310.
33. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
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IV. THE COURT’S REASONING
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion of the Court
and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.34 Justice
Thomas filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan joined.35 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion emphasized the
importance of the basic right to participate in democracy and that the
First Amendment protects political participation by way of political
contribution.36 The decision acknowledges that campaign
contributions may be limited to “protect against corruption or the
appearance of corruption,” however regulations must specifically
target “quid pro quo” corruption (recognized as a “direct exchange of
an official act for money”).37 The statute at issue in McCutcheon
involves aggregate limits as well as base limits, the latter of which
the Court has “previously upheld as serving the permissible objective
of combating corruption.”38 Here, the Court recognized that the
aggregate limits also serve an anti-corruption function by
“preventing circumvention of the base limits,” but aggregate limits
ultimately do not adequately solve that issue while simultaneously
limiting an individual’s political participation.39
The Court rejected the FEC’s argument that the aggregate limits
are constitutionally valid because the limits work to prevent
circumvention of the base limits, pointing out that legislative
measures against circumvention enacted since the Buckley decision
have only increased and strengthened.40 Furthermore, the Court
found the argument that “an individual ‘might contribute massive
amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of
unearmarked contributions’ to entities likely to support the
candidate” speculative and unconvincing—the Court has long found
“mere conjecture” inadequate to fulfill a “First Amendment
burden.”41 Because the statute could not effectively further the
governmental interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1440.
Id.
Id. at 1440–41.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1442.
Id.
Id. at 1446.
Id. at 1452.
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nor quid pro quo corruption, it “impermissibly restrict[ed]
participation in the political process.”42 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the interest in preventing corruption is extremely
important to the democratic process, but this interest is limited to
quid pro quo corruption, and limits that do not address this interest
restrict citizens’ First Amendment rights.43
V. ANALYSIS
A. Aggregate Limits Are Not Constitutionally Invalid
The Supreme Court should not have struck down the aggregate
limits on campaign contributions enacted by § 441a. Previously, the
Court has upheld limits as a constitutionally valid way to prevent
corruption associated with campaign contributions.44 McCutcheon
held that there is no constitutional justification for preventing a
wealthy individual from giving the maximum possible donation to
any and all candidates desired, asserting that as long as each donation
stays within the still-in-place individual limits, it is unlikely any
individual candidate will be unjustly influenced by financial
contributions.45 But this argument is unpersuasive. As Paul Smith
points out, “there remains no justification for regulation even if all of
these donations are packaged so that a single multi-member check is
handed to a senior member of Congress, and even if the check buys
the donor the right to meet and socialize with the party’s senior
leadership regularly.”46 Chief Justice Roberts addressed this problem
within McCutcheon’s opinion, allowing that “when donors furnish
widely distributed support within all applicable base limits, all
members of the party . . . may benefit, and the leaders of the party or
cause may feel particular gratitude.”47 However, rather than
recognizing this problem as a situation ripe for corruption, Roberts
42. Id. at 1457.
43. Id. at 1461–62.
44. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC,
453 U.S. 182 (1981); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
45. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–49.
46. Paul Smith, Symposium: McCutcheon Opens the Door to Massive Party Spending, But
Four Justices Continue to Push Back Forcefully, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 12:20 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-mccutcheon-opens-the-door-to-massive-party
-contributions-but-four-justices-continue-to-push-back-forcefully/.
47. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461.
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considers it a normality of the political process, “in which party
members join together to further common political beliefs, and
citizens can choose to support a party because they share some, most,
or all of those beliefs.”48
In McConnell, the Court found limits on “soft money”49
donations to be constitutionally valid because large soft-money
donations could potentially give an individual donor undue political
influence.50 In the McCutcheon dissent, Justice Breyer highlights the
inconsistency between the decision in McConnell and McCutcheon,
noting that despite no concrete “evidence of bribery or vote buying
in exchange for donations of nonfederal money,” the record showed
massive soft-money contributions “enabled wealthy contributors to
gain disproportionate ‘access to federal lawmakers’ and the ability to
‘influence legislation.’”51 In McConnell, this was substantial
evidence to demonstrate constitutional validity of soft-money
limits,52 in contrast with the narrow definition of corruption in the
McCutcheon decision, requiring actual occurrences of quid pro quo
corruption.53
B. The Practical Impact of McCutcheon
Setting aside whether McCutcheon was decided correctly, the
decision is unlikely to have a substantial practical impact. Critics of
the McCutcheon decision feared that “Buckley itself is on the
chopping board” and that soon enough the court will do away with
all campaign contribution limits, bringing forth unlimited and
unrestricted campaign contribution.54 This argument is unconvincing
for several reasons. First, McCutcheon did not overturn Buckley—the
Court expressly notes this within the decision, stating that the issues
of Buckley were not at issue in McCutcheon.55 Second, donors could

48. Id.
49. Money other than “hard money”—“contributions made for the purpose of influencing an
election for federal office.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93 (2003).
50. Id. at 145.
51. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
52. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145.
53. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438.
54. Mark E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 373, 373
(2014).
55. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445.
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already dodge the aggregate limits through super PAC donations56—
although the aggregate limits did present an obstacle, McCutcheon’s
decision has merely made what was already somewhat possible
easier to execute. Third, the impact of a McCutcheon-like decision
has been seen elsewhere—i.e., the aftermath of Citizens United57 as
well as the removal of aggregate limits at the state level.58 Lastly,
Shaun McCutcheon is arguably the exception, rather than the rule—it
is unlikely that there is a large pool of similarly situated
individuals.59
1. The Problem of Super PACs
In 2010, the political process saw the rise of the “‘Super PAC’—
a political action committee legally entitled to raise donations in
unlimited amounts.”60 Citizens United set forth the Supreme Court’s
holding that independent expenditures do not create the same
opportunities for corruption (or appearance of corruption) as
identified in Buckley.61 A Super PAC “makes independent
expenditures expressly supporting or opposing candidates for federal
office, but does not make any contributions to federal candidates.”62
While both PACs and Super PACs have the ability to spend without
restriction, Super PACs additionally can accept unlimited
contributions “from individuals, corporations, and unions.”63
Despite its differences from an ordinary PAC, the Super PAC’s
political power and linkage to certain candidates and parties cannot
be denied. In 2010, the highest-spending Super PACs were “broadly
ideological, partisan, or connected to traditional interest groups.”64
The 2011–2012 election cycle saw a radical shift, in which almost all
leading Super PACs focused on support for a specific candidate “or

56. Sean Sullivan, Everything You Need to Know About McCutcheon v. FEC, WASH. POST
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/10/08/supreme-court
-takes-up-the-sequel-to-citizens-united/.
57. Jan Baran, Symposium: McCutcheon and the Future of Campaign Finance Regulations,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium
-mccutcheon-and-the-future-of-campaign-finance-regulation/.
58. Elias & Berkon, supra note 54, at 377.
59. Baran, supra note 57.
60. Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644 (May 2012).
61. Id. at 1645.
62. Id. at 1646.
63. Id. at 1647.
64. Id. at 1675.
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were formed at the behest of party leaders.”65 Although McCutcheon
certainly makes it easier for an individual to donate larger amounts to
a variety of candidates, before the decision it would have arguably
been possible through donations to a Super PAC as well. As Robert
K. Kelner (“Kelner”) points out, “Major donors never stopped
writing big checks after McCain-Feingold [FECA]. They just wrote
them to unregulated outside groups . . . and other . . . political
vehicles.”66
Thus, McCutcheon is not likely to have the staggering impact
warned by critics.67 Even if individuals began donating on a massive
scale, it is unlikely that they will “materially” impact the “relative
advantage held by unregulated outside groups.”68 It is the Super
PACs’ troubling and rising power that holds the potential to
drastically alter the landscape of campaign finance.69 McCutcheon is,
as Kelner puts it, a mere “ripple on the campaign finance pond, not a
tsunami.”70
2. Prior Occurrences
a. The Lackluster Impact of Citizens United
Those who see McCutcheon as a death knell for campaign
finance regulation may have forgotten that such a decision is not a
novel occurrence. Citizens United struck down limits on corporate
campaign spending,71 a decision for which “the Court [took] a brutal
battering in the court of public opinion.”72 Described as an
“astonishingly naïve decision”73 that was a “shocking instance of
judicial overreach,”74 some predicted it would “unleash up to $1
trillion in corporate money for attack ads in the next election
65. Id.
66. Robert K. Kelner, The Practical Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
380, 384 (2014).
67. Elias & Berkon, supra note 54, at 373.
68. Kelner, supra note 66, at 384.
69. See id. at 386.
70. Id.
71. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
72. Joel Gora, Symposium: McCutcheon v. FEC and the Fork in the Road, SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 15, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-mccutcheon-v-fec
-and-the-fork-in-the-road/.
73. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Op-Ed., A Bipartisan Push to Clean Up the Supreme Court’s Mess,
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/07
/AR2010030702679.html.
74. Id.
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cycle.”75 While undoubtedly a departure from previous judicial
precedent, the Citizens United decision yielded a relatively minor
practical impact.76 In fact, while the amount of money spent in
subsequent elections did rise, it did not do so more rapidly than it had
in preceding elections.77 Thus, the “stampede” of money President
Obama predicted in his 2010 State of the Union address to result
from the Citizens United decision failed to materialize.78 Radical
Supreme Court decisions do not always garner radical results—just
because McCutcheon is a dramatic change does not mean it will
bring forth immediate dramatic change.
b. Limits at the State Level
Following on the heels of the McCutcheon decision, officials in
Maryland and Massachusetts “have announced that they would not
enforce their states’ aggregate limits.”79 The decision also influenced
Wisconsin to stop enforcing its aggregate limit—previously, donors
in Wisconsin could only contribute an overall total of $10,000 per
year to “all registered Wisconsin committees (including candidates,
parties, and PACs) . . . but did not separately limit what [an]
individual could contribute to a party committee or PAC.”80 The
2011 and 2012 recall elections in Wisconsin reported high numbers
from outside-group spending,81 showing that the aggregate limits
merely forced restricted donors to get creative. Marc E. Elias and
Jonathan S. Berkon predict that the change in Wisconsin law “will
give the parties a chance to regain their influence” through in-state
donors no longer restricted by aggregate limits,82 rather than bring in
a mass influx of unlimited and corruptive contributions.

75. Jon Talton, Supreme Court’s Momentous Decision Will Derail Any Financial Reform,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 21 2010, 10:05 AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/jontalton/2010/01/21
/supreme_courts_momentous_decis/.
76. Baran, supra note 57.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Maryland and Massachusetts are two of the twelve states that have similar aggregate
limits in place. Elias & Berkon, supra note 54, at 377.
80. Id. at 378.
81. See id.
82. Id.
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3. Shaun McCutcheon: One of a Very Few of a Kind
McCutcheon wrote checks to sixteen candidates in the 2012
election before hitting the aggregate limit while lamenting his
inability to write checks to an additional ten candidates he wished to
support and, as Jan Baran puts it, “had the charming patriotic habit of
making his checks payable in the amount of $1776”83—it cannot be
denied that McCutcheon is a unique individual. Beyond his
contribution idiosyncrasies, however, is the fact that McCutcheon
(and fellow like-minded donors) make up a very small population of
individuals—extraordinarily wealthy and willing to spread that
wealth around to a large number of candidates. The dissent in
McCutcheon lays out a diabolical hypothetical in which individuals
“contribute to every candidate and every committee . . . thereby
dispens[ing] over $3 million in contributions.”84 It is unlikely that
McCutcheon-esque donors will give to more candidates than
previously to make a substantial impact, and the McCutcheon
decision will likely result only in a modest increase in “funding in a
system that during 2011–2012 saw $7.2 billion raised and spent.”85
Since the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon, only 310 donors have
surpassed the aggregate limits previously in place.86 Overall, the
donors gave $50.2 million—$11.6 million more than permitted preMcCutcheon.87 While $11.6 million is no figure to scoff at, when
viewed in relation to an overall funding system capable of raising
$7.2 billion,88 it is nothing more than a drop in a bucket. While the
McCutcheon decision is recent enough that contribution data remains
unavailable, McCutcheon will result in only minor changes in overall
contributions.89 Donors responded to earlier limitations and
regulations on contributions by funneling money through Super
PACs90—while the money stays consistent, the channels change.

83. Baran, supra note 57.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Chris Cillizza, How McCutcheon Has Already Changed Campaign Finance, in 1 Chart,
WASH. POST (Sep. 2, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/09/02/how
-mccutcheon-has-already-changed-campaign-finance-in-1-chart/.
87. Id.
88. Baran, supra note 57.
89. And, perhaps instances of decreased contributions to Super PACs and other
less-regulated political vehicles.
90. See Sullivan, supra note 56.
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C. The Legal Impact of McCutcheon
As discussed above, McCutcheon’s practical impact will be
minor. The legal implications of the decision, however, may pose
more serious consequences.
The decision in McCutcheon is another91 step down a new path
for the Court—one that is steadily overturning forty years of national
policy and thirty-eight years of judicial precedent.92 Since Buckley in
1976, the Court has “consistently upheld the constitutionality of
federal contribution limits.”93 The Buckley Court characterized
aggregate limits as “modest restraint”94 appropriate for the purpose
of curbing financial corruption, while the McCutcheon Court found
no constitutional basis for such limits.95
Such a departure from precedent raises questions about the
decision’s legal impact. While the Court upheld individual and base
limits, future plaintiffs will likely challenge those limits. What was
considered constitutionally kosher in 1976 has become
constitutionally invalid today.96 While this is perhaps an overly
dramatic snowball effect argument, it is possible that the Court will
continue to chip away at campaign regulation until very little or no
regulation remains.
VI. CONCLUSION
While McCutcheon should not have struck down the aggregate
limits set forth by § 441a, the decision in practical terms likely left
current campaign finance law unchanged Super PAC donations
already existed as an avenue around the aggregate limits, and a large
cohort of political supporters with the resources and donation
ambitions of Shaun McCutcheon most likely does not exist.97
However, McCutcheon represents another step taken by the Supreme
Court toward less and less regulation of campaign finance,98

91. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
92. See Fred Wertheimer, The McCutcheon Case: Consequences If SCOTUS Strikes Down
Overall Contribution Limits, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2014, 4:55 PM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/fred-wertheimer/the-mccutcheon-v-fec-case-sotus_b_4849278.html.
93. Id.
94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam).
95. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
96. Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. See Baran, supra note 57.
98. See Wertheimer, supra note 92.
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highlighting its likely substantial legal impact. As Supreme Court
decisions move away from Buckley and toward McCutcheon, the
standard of actively regulating campaign finance grows dimmer and
may one day completely vanish. Corruptive campaign finance
strategies serve no valid purpose in the political process and must be
eliminated. While McCutcheon may seem innocuous in terms of
practical impact, the legal precedent it reinforces could drastically
alter the political landscape.
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